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THE ILLINOIS BAIL SYSTEM:
A SECOND LOOK
By TYCE S. SMITH*

and JAMES

W.

REILLEY**

On January 1, 1964, a new bail system was instituted in
Illinois. The initial result of this system was the elimination
of the traditional bail bondsman and the substitution of a
unique bail system in its stead.1 Primarily, the new system
provides for: first, the substitution of penalties of a penal
rather than monetary nature to insure the appearance of a
defendant by making bail jumping under any type of bond a
separate criminal offense ;2 secondly, the liberal use of release
on personal recognizance or release on the signature of the defendant ;3 and, finally, allowance of a defendant to be released
from custody upon the "deposit with the clerk of the court...
[of] a sum of money equal to 10% of the bail which had been
set by the court and the clerk of the court ...

and retention of

10% of the amount so deposited as a bail bond cost. ' ' 4
The position of the United States Supreme Court on admission to bail was stated by Justice Jackson in Stack v. Boyle,
when he wrote:
The practice of admission to bail, as it has evolved in Anglo* B.S.,

Kansas University;

J.D.,

Washburn

University Law School

(Topeka, Kansas); presently doing graduate work towards an M.B.A. at

DePaul University and attending the Lawyers Institute at The John Marshall
Law School, where he serves as mentor.
** B.S., Loyola University; J.D. with honor, The John Marshall Law
School, 1969. Mr. Reilley is an instructor at John Marshall in the Argument
course. Formerly Assistant State's Attorney of Cook County, Illinois.
Partner with Tyce S. Smith in the firm of Smith & Reilley in Chicago, specializing in criminal defense.
1 Boyle, Bail Under the Judicial Article, 17 DEPAUL L. REV. 267 (1968).
2 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §32-10 (1971):
Violation of Bail Bond
Whoever, having been admitted to bail for appearance before any court
of record of this State, incurs a forfeiture of the bail and wilfully fails
to surrender himself within 30 days following the date of such forfeiture,
shall, if the bail was given in connection with a charge of felony or
pending appeal or certiorari after conviction of any offense, be fined not
more than-$5,000 or imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than five
years, or both; or if the bail was given in connection with a charge of
committing a misdemeanor, or for appearance as a witness, be fined
not more than $1,000 or imprisoned in a penal institution other than
the penitentiary, not more than one year or both.
See Kamin, Bail Administration in Illinois, 53 Ill. B.J. 674 (1965).
3Id. §110-2.
When from all the circumstances the court is of the opinion that the
accused will appear as required either before or after conviction the
accused may be released on his own recognizance.
4 Id.

§110-7 (a), (f).

34

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure

[Vol. 6:33

American law, is not a device for keeping persons in jail upon
mere accusation until it is found convenient to give them a
trial. On the contrary, the spirit of the procedure is to enable
them to stay out of jail until a trial has found them guilty.
Without this conditional privilege, even those wrongly accused
are punished by a period of imprisonment while awaiting trial
and are handicapped in consulting counsel, searching for evidence and witnesses, and prepar'ng a defense.5
Recent efforts of reform," although severely criticized, have
instituted a form of preventive detention abhorrent to AngloAmerican jurisprudence. 7 A viable alternative must soon be
found before such a system is instituted on a widescale basis.
It has been some years since any type of empirical study
has been done of the Illinois bonding system. With the cooperation of the clerk of the court, the following statistics were compiled over a period of six months, forming the foundation of this
article." While acknowledging the brave advance of the new
bail system, the results of this study are submitted with the
belief that both modifications and reforms are presently needed.
PRELIMINARY

STUDIES

Chicago Study
The Illinois bail system is founded on three fundamental
premises. First, factual studies prove that the great majority
of persons released on bail have no intention of violating bail
and will appear for trial. Second, to the extent that pecuniary
loss is a deterrent, such financial loss should be minimized in
the case of the person who appears for trial. Finally, a person who will jump bail is not deterred by the prospect of pecuniary loss to himself or anyone else and other deterrents are
therefore required.9
The factual studies supporting these premises were conducted primarily in the early 1960's, but as early as 1927, the
then existing Chicago bail bond system was being severely
criticized in the classic Chicago Study of Arthur Beeley. 10 This
5342 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1951).
6 District of Columbia Court of Reform and Criminal Procedure Act.
Pub. L. 91-358, 84 STAT. 473 et seq. (1970) ; Title II, §210, ch. 13, sub. ch.
III §23-1321-32.
7 Miller, Preventive Detention - A Guide to the Eradication of Individual Rights, 15 How. L.J. 1 (Fall 1970); Hruska, Preventive Detention:
The Constitution and the Congress, 3 CREIGHT. L. REv. 36 (Fall 1969);
Allington, Preventive Detention of the Accused Before Trial, 19 KAN. L.
REV. 69 (Fall 1970).
8 A sample technique was utilized only when a totality of figures for
Cook County or Chicago could not be obtained. When a sample was required,
a random technique was used based on a sample population where possible.
9 Committee's comment, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §110 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1970).

10BEELEY,

THE BAIL SYSTEM IN

CHICAGO

(1927).
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study examined the background of 90% of the unsentenced
jail population, establishing that 70% had families and reputable persons in the community to speak for them, and only 50%
had any prior criminal convictions. Yet, release on personal
recognizance occurred in only 50% of the cases, and those
were only for minor offenses.
The most significant finding, however, was that 28% were
needlessly detained, while undependable bail risks were allowed
to be free on bail. In light of Beeley's conclusion that hardened
criminals were allowed freedom while better bail risks
were not, he recommended the following:
(1) widescale use
of the summons to replace the prevailing arrest procedure
(75% of all criminal cases were initiated by arrests) ; (2) a
constitutional amendment to allow selective preventive detention; (3) background investigatory procedures so that bail
setting could be an individual determination rather than being
geared to an arbitrary bond schedule as it was in 1927.11 These
findings formed the working hypothesis of each of the subsequent studies.
The Manhattan Project
(Vera Project)
This project, which was the foundation for all subsequent
studies, was initiated by a wealthy chemical industrialist,
Louis Schweitzer, upon discovery of the shocking jail abuses
which existed in New York City. Mr. Schweitzer founded and
funded the Vera Foundation, which conducted an experiment
based on the premise that certain persons with strong community ties could safely be released on their own recognizance,
and that if an investigatory procedure verified this background
and supplied this information to the courts, the individual could
be released without financial security. The initial procedures
of the study were effectuated by New York University Law
students who interviewed "indigent defendants.' 1 2 To eliminate from the sample technique other exogenous variables
which might introduce error and seriously impair the reliability
of the study, there was a selective exclusion of certain offenses
1 3
from the study including sex, narcotics, and homicide.
"tA summary of Beeley's pioneer study appears in Freed and Ward,
1964, prepared as a working paper for the
National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice held on May 27-29, 1964,
at Washington D.C., under the co-sponsorship of the United States Department of Justice and the Vera Foundation, Inc. Beeley's treatise is also
discussed in Attorney General Commision, REPORT ON POVERTY AND THE
BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES:

ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

(Feb. 25, 1963).

"Indigent" was defined as not being represented by an attorney at
arraignment.
13 Ralls, Bail in the United States, 48 MIcTI. S.B.J. 28 (Jan. 1969).
12
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Four factors were selected as determinative of the risk
inherent in releasing an individual on his own recognizance:
(1) residential stability; (2) employment history; (3) family
contacts in city; and (4) prior criminal record. Each individual interviewed was assigned a certain number of points
per designated criterion, and if the point total was sufficient, he
was recommended for release on individual recognizance. Preliminary figures indicated a favorable comparison with forfeiture rates on bail bonds. The first reports showed that among
the 3,505 defendants released under the project, only 50 or
1.4% failed to appear, while this compared to a 3% forfeiture
rate on bail bonds. 14 Later reports were not as favorable; the
program expanded, and the forfeiture rate for those released on
bail bonds was 4.4% ; for those released on recognizance, 15.4%;
and for those posting cash bail, 19.4%.15
The Vera study had the benefit of an earlier study, the
findings of which differed only slightly.1 6 The earlier study
indicated that a defendant freed on bond had a substantially
better chance to be acquitted than a jailed defendant. Thus,
both studies reached the conclusion that the failure to grant
the release on bond has a substantial and unreasonable effect
upon the determination of a case.
In Des Moines, Iowa, a study parallel to the Vera Foundation Study in New York was sponsored by the Hawley Welfare Foundation. The Hawley Project excluded cases of murder, forcible rapes, narcotics, and sex crimes. At the end of
the first year of operation, of the 750 released under the program, only 12 were bond forfeitures, or a rate of only 1.5%.7
Many similar experiments were conducted in other cities.18 The

two most significant of these were the District of Columbia and
Los Angeles studies. The only real difference between these
projects, however, was the presence of a salaried investigator in
the Los Angeles project.' 9
The San Francisco Bail Project
Instituted by the San Francisco Bar Association and augmented by VISTA volunteers in 1964, this project studied the
bail setting procedure in San Francisco. The project was mod14 Ares, Rankin, and Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim
Report on the Use of Pre-Trial Parole, 38 N.Y.U. L. REv. 67 (1963).
15 Schaeffer, Report on Bail & Parole Jumping in Manhattan, VERA
INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE (1970).
16 Roberts and Palerno, A Study of the Administration of Bail in New
York City, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 693 (1958).
17 Workshop: Establishing Bail Projects, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 42, 45.
18 Note 8 supra.
19 Los Angeles Superior Court, RELEASE OF DEFENDANTS WITHOUT BAIL:
PRELIMINARY PILOT STUDY REPORT (Sept. 1964).
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eled after the Vera study; however, the standards for release
were more liberal since capital crimes were excluded. Approximately 70% of those released were charged with a felony. An
important procedure, followed to a lesser extent in the Vera
project, was an intensive "follow-up" in which the defendants
were notified of court appearances and assisted in obtaining
counsel.
The following statistics indicate the number of persons
accused of a crime who had been released on their own recognizance through the project from August 1 to July 31.
Table

120

1964-1965

415

1965-1966
1966-1967
1967-1968

1,326
2,374
2,262
6,377

Perhaps due to the more liberal release standards, the 10%
forfeiture rate was quite high.
Other bail projects in which VISTA participated took
place in Philadelphia, Miami, Tulsa and Baltimore. As a result of these projects, although more than 6,000 defendants were
released, only an average of 3% failed to appear for trial.21
Kalamazoo County Study
A more recent study took place in Kalamazoo County,
Michigan, differing from the other studies in that it took place
in a small midwestern county and the release criteria were
more stringent, since all crimes of violence were excluded from
the sample technique.22 Significantly, the results of the study
were similar to those in more urban areas, in that of the 395
persons released on their own recognizance between October 31,
1966 and December 31, 1968, only three willfully failed to appear. Also, a definite correlation between pre-trial detention
and eventual conviction or jail sentence was found.
Cook County Bail Project
The Cook County Bail Project 2. was a study, done basically
by lay persons, of both the felony and misdemeanor versions
Levin, The San Francisco Bail Project, 55 A.B.A.J. 135 (1969).
VISTA Volunteers Bring About Successful Bail Reform
Project in Baltimore, 54 A.B.A.J. 1093 (1968).
22 Hawthorne
and McCully, Release on Recognizance in Kalamazoo
County, 49 MIcH. S.B.J. 23 (July 1970).
23 Mosely, Analysis of Cook County Bail Bond Project, a study by the
Alliance to End Repression (1970).
20

21 Kennedy,

38

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure

[ Vol. 6:33

of "Holiday Court. '' 24 The study was undertaken to determine the effect of the following section of the Illinois Bail Reform Act:
When from all of the circumstances the court is of the opinion
that the accused will appear as required either before or after
convict*on the accused may be released on his own recognizance
.... This S'3ction shall be liberally construed to effectuate the
purpose of relying upon criminal sanctions instead of financial
loss to assure the appearance of the accused.2
The purpose of the study was to record four main observations: (1) the time given to the consideration of each case,
(2) the frequency of representation by counsel, (3) the frequency of release of the accused on his own recognizance, or
as it is termed, on Individual or "I" bond, and (4) the extent
of questioning by the court concerning the accused's financial
ability to meet the bond levied. The statistics demonstrated
that: (1) the average bail hearing lasted less than one minute,
(2) bonds were set for hundreds of people each weekend without legal representation, 26 (3) too few persons were released on
their own recognizance, and, finally (4) in the great majority
of cases no inquiry was made concerning the financial ability of
the accused to make bail. Moreover, the most disturbing statistics showed that only 45 out of 1,171, or 3.8% of the bonds set
were "I" bonds.
These statistical studies vividly illustrate the substantial
difference that can exist between the results obtained in a
tightly controlled experimental environment and in actual everyday operation. Illinois did not adopt the background investigatory and back-up procedures followed by the various
studies and, consequently, the Cook County Bail Project demonstrated the deplorable results.
BAIL OPERATIONS IN COOK COUNTY

Cook County is divided into six judicial districts composed of Chicago, which constitutes District I, and five outlying
suburban areas. There are three types of bonds set in the
Illinois court system: (1) the "I" bond or the individual recognizance bond; (2) the "D" bond in which the accused posts 10%
of the judicially set bond in cash and 10% of this amount is
retained by the county to meet administrative expenses ;27 and
24A "Holiday Court" is one that regularly convenes at the criminal
court building on weekends and holidays for purposes of setting bail for

defendants arrested the night before.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §110-2 (1971).
2",
As a result of this study, the Public Defender's Office of Cook County
2-

now assigns duty attorneys for Holiday Court.
27 The constitutionality of this procedure was recently upheld by the
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(3) the "C" bond, which is of a pre-set amount for a minor
offense and involves no judicial discretion. The "C" bond is difficult to evaluate because of the entering of an ex parte judgment when the defendant fails to appear. The judgment is
in the nature of a finding of guilty with the punishment being
a court order that the bond be taken as a fine. For the purposes
of this article, thus, only the "I" and "D" bonds are evaluated.
The following table demonstrates the positive effect of the
Cook County Bail Project.

Table 228
Year

Quantity
D Bonds I Bonds
13,361
14,752
21,815

Total
D&I
124,518
135,691
152,287

Percentage
D's to Total I's to Total
89.60
89.13
82.95

10.40
10.87
17.05

1969
1970
1971

111,157
120,939
130,472

1969
1970
1971

Bonds Posted Municipal District I - Chicago
10.40
9,777
93,979
89.60
84,202
10.40
10,553
101,491
89.60
90,938
17.64
82.36
99,112
21,215
120,327

The "I" Bond
Release on individual recognizance, or "I" bond, is permitted in cases that fall within the purview of the first fundamental premise of the Ilinois bond system, that " . . . persons released on bail have no intention of violating bail and
will appear for trial." 29 Moreover, the significant difference
between the number of "I" bonds set by courts between 1970
and 1971 must in great part be attributed to the Cook County
Bail Project. When compared with the first three years of
operation of the Illinois bail system, these figures accurately
demonstrate the weakness of the system.

Year
1964
1965
1966

Table 33o
Bonds Posted - Cook County
D's to Total
D Bonds
I Bonds Total
D&I
27,956
6,465
34,421
81.22
82.27
46,418
10,002
56,420
11,237
79,592
85.88
68,355

I's to Total
18.78
17.73
14.12

United States Supreme Court in the case of Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357
(1971).
28 Administrative report from the office of the Clerk of the Court of Cook
County to Judge Peter Bakakos, Chief Judge of Surety Division.
29 Note 9 supra at 299.
30 Note 1 supra at 272.
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Although a novelty, judges and magistrates were cognizant of both the statutory provisions governing the new
procedure and its legislative intent. However, as time passed
the use of release on individual recognizance rapidly diminished, clearly reflecting both increased case loads and judicial
apathy. The large percentage of bond forfeitures occurring
among those defendants who were the beneficiaries of the "I"
bond release resulted in the judiciary rapidly becoming wary
of this particular pre-trial method.
A comparison of the early and later years of operation
shows a disturbing trend.
Table 431
I Bond Forfeitures - Municipal District No. 1, Chicago
Year
Bond Quantity
Quantity of
Percentage of
Forfeitures
Forfeitures
1964
6,465
446
7
1965
10,002
1,562
15
1966
11,237
2,324
20.5
3
I Bond Forfeitures - Cook County 2
Year
Bond Quantity
Quantity of
Percentage of
Forfeitures
Forfeitures
1969
9,777
2,134
21.80
1970
10,553
2,260
31.41
1971
21,215
4,789
22.57
It is obvious that in Cook County the majority of all bonds
were posted in Chicago. The results of a free operation of the
system have been discouraging when compared with the other
studies.

The "D" Bond
Clearly, many weaknesses did and still exist in the present system of setting "I" bonds. However, the "D" or 10%
bond, based on the second fundamental premise that financial
loss shopld be minimized for an accused, presents an entirely
different situation. There is no apparent reason for the figure
of 10%, except that this was the normal amount charged by
the professional bail bondsman as a premium to meet an accused's bond. The Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 was obviously modeled after the Illinois Act of 1964 and provides
for the 10% deposit and individual release; however, this plan
allows for the placement of a corporate surety. 8
81 Id.
82 Note 22 supra.

33 18 U.S.C. §3146.
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An examination of the forfeiture record for "D" bonds
shows that the rate has remained fairly constant over the
years.

Table 534
"D" Bond Forfeitures- Municipal District No. 1

1964
1965
1966

Quantity of
D Bonds
27,956
46,418
68,355

1969
1970
1971

84,202
90,938
99,112

Year

Quantity of
Forfeitures
6,465
10,002
11,237

Percentage of
Forfeitures
7.5
10.5
11

11,402
12,086
13,172

13.54
11.09
13.29

Rate as Held Over the County (is a Whole
Year
1969
1970
1971

Quantity of
D Bonds
111,157
120,939
130.472

Quantity of
Forfeitures
14,316
15,098
16,421

Percentage of
Forfeitures
12.88
12.48
12.59

One apparent explanation for the rate difference between
"D" and "I" Bond forfeitures is that the Illinois bonding system
allows the bond monies to be refunded to the defendant's attorney, by court order, after the defendant has consented to such
procedure in open court. Consequently, this refund right provides incentive for an attorney to move to vacate a bond forfeiture in order to protect his fee. Moreover, in Illinois there
is a 30-day grace period before judgment is taken.3 5 The differential created by this process can be observed by noting the following statistics of Municipal District No. 1:
Table 636

Year
1970
1971

Quantity
Percentage
Forfeitures
Forfeitures to Received
I Bonds D Bonds I Bonds D Bonds I
2,260
12,086
21.41
11.09
4,789
13,172
22.57
13.29

Percentage
Judgments
To Forfeitures
Bonds D Bonds
81.1
40.9
77.8
52.6

34 Statistics for years 1964-66, see note 1 supra.
Statistics for years
1969-71, see note 8 supra.
35 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §110-7(g) (1971).
36 Note 28 supra, and figures compiled from the reco ,ds of the Clerk of
the Court of Cook County.
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Year
1970
1971
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Percentage
Reinstatements to
Quantity
Quantity
Forfeitures
Judgments
Bond Reinstatements
I Bonds D Bonds I Bonds D Bonds I Bonds D Bonds
5,785
17.3
47.8
1,868
6,361
392
3,649
6,455
1,140
6,717
24.4
50.9
ANALYSIS

The criminal penalties for bail jumping and the basic
theory on which the Illinois bond system is based are defined
in section 32-10 of the Illinois Criminal Code.3 1 Statistics indicate that this statute has been seldom enforced. For purposes
of this article a sample was taken in the preliminary hearing and
misdemeanor courts of some 3,500 cases in 1970 and 1971, which
revealed that only three of these cases were being prosecuted
for bail jumping. The post-indictment sample showed a far
greater number of prosecutions; of the 750 cases in the sample
population, 23 were being prosecuted for bail jumping. Yet, in
1970 and 1971 approximately 18,333 defendants were amenable
to prosecution for violation of section 32-10. Thus, if the theory
is that potential bond jumpers will be deterred by possible penal
punishment, it has evidently not become reality. Certainly no
court-wise defendant is deterred in the least, since the failure to
initiate prosecution for violation of this statute has become
common street knowledge.
A major reason for the failure to prosecute bail jumpers
is that little effort is made to apprehend the defendant after a
warrant is issued. There are few police officers assigned to
this warrant duty; only two or three per police district. These
officers are responsible for serving all warrants including the
scofflaw multiple parking violations. Seemingly, the apprehension system depends on the defendant being picked up on
another charge or traffic offense, and catching the warrant
when he is fingerprinted and run through the Bureau of Identification, since rarely do these officers have time to search for a
fugitive.
There are several possible explanations for the disparity
between "D" and "I" bond reinstatement of forfeiture warrants.
First, the defendant has a monetary interest in the "D" bond
which he does not have in the "I" bond. Second, the defendant
given an "1" bond has no prior criminal record or at least only
a minor one, and is generally not picked up on another offense.
Third, a judge who has once granted a defendant the privilege
31 Note 2 supra.
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of release might well hesitate to reinstate the bond once he has
already trusted this particular defendant to be released on his
own recognizance. Finally, both the court and prosecutor know
that the attorney appearing before the court with the defendant,
making a motion to vacate a bond forfeiture, in all probability
depends on the proceeds of the bond as part or all of his fee, and
would hesitate to deny or obstruct that motion. In essence, what
has happened is that the greater portion of the retrieval function of these fugitives has fallen on the private attorney who
must bring his defendant before the court in order to protect
his fee. Consequently, one of the functions of a professional
surety, supposedly obviated by the bond reform, has become the
responsibility of the privately retained defense counsel.
The "D" bond or deposit of 10% is a seemingly worthless
system without logical foundation. For instance, if a bond of
$5,000 is set by a court, that defendant must post only $500 to
obtain release. If the defendant fails to appear, a judgment
is taken for the excess due on the bond. Generally, the county
only collects the $500 posted as 10% of the bond. The records of the Clerk of the Court of Cook County indicate that
in 1969 there were $519,764 in excess judgments; in 1970,
$662,036; and in 1971, $733,519. Research efforts fail to reveal
one cent in excess judgments being collected in Cook County."8
Further, since the 10% requirement is altogether arbitrary, it
should follow that if an actual bond is to be $500, the bond
should be set at that figure.
On the positive side, allowing the attorney to collect his
fee by having the defendant sign over the bond slip after the
case has been disposed of in some manner has genuine merit.
Such practice is a substantial crime preventive measure, since
the defendant will not be under pressure to meet the monetary
demands of his attorney or to make bond simultaneously.
EVALUATION OF THE ILLINOIS BAIL SYSTEM

While this broad evaluation demonstrates the basic weaknesses that now plague the Illinois bond system and will severely
impair the Illinois criminal justice system in urban areas like
Chicago, it is suggested that the initiation of the following
might improve the Illinois bond system.
First, judges should be assigned whose sole function is to
set bond. This action would remove the initial burden from the
38 Recently a policy has been instituted in which excess judgments have
been filed with the Recorder of Deeds so that if a defendant against whom
a judgment has been taken attempts some sort of real estate transaction,

that judgment will prevent the transaction until it is satisfied.
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now overcrowded preliminary hearing courts, since the 1970
Illinois Constitution has guaranteed, unless expressly waiveda3 a
preliminary hearing to practically every defendant. Illinois has
already instituted a night bond court and a "holiday court,"
where judges are temporarily assigned only to make available
to a defendant the quickest possible bail hearing. A defendant
in a non-capital case would be taken first to this judge who
would conduct the bond hearing and set bond. The defendant,
in the case of a felony, would be assigned to a judge for a preliminary hearing; and, in the case of a misdemeanor, would be
assigned to a court for trial. If the defendant continues to be
detained as a result of his inability to meet the conditions of
release initially imposed, he can ask that bond be reviewed by
the judicial officer to whom he has been assigned. A time limit
for review should be established as in federal criminal procedure, where after 24 hours the defendant can request review."0
However, in federal procedure the review is first made by the
judge imposing the conditions of release. The constitutional
guarantee of a prompt preliminary hearing in Illinois would
obviate this procedure. Hence, the reviewing judge would not
be conducting a hearing de novo, since he would have before him
the record of the previous bond hearing. Moreover, the time
consumed by this review would be minimal.
Further review would be available to the defendant accused of a felony after indictment at the arraignment and trial
court level. The judges sitting in the bond courts should be
permanently assigned as are the judges in the night bond and
"holiday court". Understandably, this is a difficult judicial
position; however, it simply requires a jurist of substantial
stature to establish procedural safeguards and proper administrative structuring.
Second, sufficient information should be supplied a judge
so that he can set a proper bond. Personnel should be
available to interview defendants and to verify that information. An attorney, as an officer of the court, should be required to provide the court with substantial background information, accurately verified by himself, and information supplied
by the defendant or other witnesses should be brought before
the court. Further, the witnesses should be advised of the
danger of committing perjury and any violation should be vigorously prosecuted. Verification procedures should be maintained following release, and timely personal reminders to de39

ILL. CONST., art. 1, §7, (1970).
40 18 F.C.A. §3146(a).
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fendants of their court date would save a lot of bond forfeitures
and paper work at a later date.
Third, both a vigorous system of apprehension of defendants not complying with bond appearance requirements and
rigid prosecution of bond jumpers would put teeth in the penal
provisions of the statute. Although the present ease of vacating bond forfeitures by attorneys who appear with their clients
should not be eliminated, since it would both discourage fugitives from voluntarily appearing and cast the burden of rearrest on the police, the repetition of the process by a single
defendant should be promptly discouraged by the court.
These first three recommendations are not novel, but in
some form or other have been suggested by most bond studies.
They would necessitate an increase and shift in manpower;
however, any increase in expenditures would quickly be more
than countered by savings in jail costs, administrative procedures, and other losses incurred under the present system.
A fourth suggestion adopts the highly controversial position of providing for the valuable alternative of placing the
responsibility of a defendant's appearance on an ethical insurance company. The trend of the most scholarly thinking
has been for the elimination of the professional bail bondsman. 41

The Illinois bond system was established to correct

that problem and give the judge complete discretion in setting
bail. 42 Notably, however, the federal statute governing bail
did not eliminate the bail bondsman but, rather, made specific
provisions for the existence of professional surety companies 4
and their power to arrest and deliver the defendant. The continued existence of these insurance companies within the federal system has certainly established their viability and usefulness. Consequently, the omission of this valuable tool in
Illinois has limited the complete discretion of the judge.4 4
41

1971).

Murphy, Revision of State Bail Laws, 32 01io ST. L.J. 451 (Summer
-

Bowman, Hearing S. 2839 and S. 2840 before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights and Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. at 164 (1964).
4318 U.S.C. §§3142 and 3146(a)(4) (1969).
§3142 provides: "Any
party . . . who is released on the execution of an appearance bail bond with
one or more sureties, may, in vacation, be arrested by his surety, and delivered to the marshal or his deputy . .. ."
44 Absolute discretion does not exist in the federal system, since preferred release methods are stipulated by the Federal Bail Reform Act of
1966. 18 U.S.C. §3146(a) (4) (1969).
42

Release in non-capital cases prior to trial.
(a) Any person charged with an offense, other than an offense punish-

able by death, shall, at his appearance before a judicial officer, be

ordered released pending trial on his personal recognizance or upon the
execution of an unsecured appearance bond in an amount specified by
the judicial officer, unless the officer determines, in the exercise of his
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Although the spirit of the Bail Reform Act is to favor nonfinancial conditions of bail where the defendant lacks "means
and roots," it becomes appropriate to be as reasonably assured
as is practical that the bail givers are not intending merely to
free the defendant, but have a real interest in his appearance. 4.
There exist several cogent reasons why the insurance company alternative should be made available to the judge setting
conditions of pre-trial release.4 G Where non-financial conditions
appear insufficient to guard against flight, there should exist
some provision by which the judge may require the place-7
4
ment of a surety bond with an ethical insurance company.
Also, the bond forfeiture rate prior to the Illinois Bond Reform
Act was substantially lower than after the elimination of the
professional bail bondsmen. Under the surety system, there
was a 7.7% default rate in the First Municipal District of the
Circuit Court of Cook County4 8 In recent years, the forfeiture
rate on "D" bonds has lingered around 13% in the First Municipal District.4' There would be a substantial monetary incentive to the pursuers of absent defendants as well, since the
surety companies would be placing bonds of a more substantial
amount. 0 Finally, adoption of this proposal would increase
the number of civil judgments in cases where the surety company provides for the release of a defendant. Presently, there

are no collections made of excess judgments on "D" bonds and
"I" bonds.

A vigorous enforcement and collection policy on

discretion, that such a release will not reasonably assure the appearance
of the person as required. When such a determination is made, the
judicial officer shall, either in lieu of or in addition to the above methods
of release, impose the first of the following conditions of release which
will reasonably assure the appearance of the person for trial or, if no
single condition gives that assurance, any combination of the following
conditions:
(4) require the execution of a bail bond with sufficient solvent sureties,
or the deposit of cash in lieu thereof.
Failure of a federal judge to observe these established priorities is an abuse
of discretion. United States v. Kirkman, 426 F.2d 747 (4th Cir. 1970).
45 United States v. Melville, 309 F. Supp. 824 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
4" The existence
of the bail bondsman and his function have been
specifically recognized in Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. 366 (1872).
41 The extensive subcommittee hearings held prior to the passage of the
Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 did not reveal any weakness in the custodial
function of sureties.
48 Kamin, Bail Administration in Illinois, 53 ILL. B.J. 674, 680 (1965);
Bowman, Illinois Ten Per Cent Bail Deposit Provision, 1965 ILL. L.F. 35, 39.

4an 1969 the figure was 13.34 per cent, 1970 -

1971 -

11.09 per cent and

13.29 per cent.

50 Critics of the surety system hold that it should be completely eliminated; the most prominent of these, Foote, has stated:
The claims that bondsmen provide any significant function in policing
those on bail and finding them once they have absconded seem frivolous
to me. There is no evidence that they actually perform any significant
custodial function and it is unreasonable to expect them to do so.

Foote, The Coning Constitutiol Crisis in Bail, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1125,

1162 (1965).
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outstanding bond forfeitures could realize substantial sums of
money when added to the collections of the 1% administrative
51
cost now placed on "D" bonds.
CONCLUSION

The ideal situation is to have a well-informed judge with
broad discretion make an unhurried determination of the pretrial release condition necessary to insure the appearance of
a particular defendant. The Illinois bond reform was a brave
step, but as a working system there are some observable weaknesses which must be corrected.
What is recommended is to give the judge setting bail all
the tools he needs: proper information, a selection of all possible pre-trial release procedures, and tools for vigorous enforcement and prosecution of bond jumpers.
The judicial official making the critical decision of what
pre-trial release conditions should prevail as to an individual
accused should have sufficient time to make that determination.
In order to have the necessary and adequate time to weigh the
myriad of variables, the judge cannot be forced to operate a
priority system of preliminary hearings, bond hearings, motions
to suppress, and misdemeanor bench trials. His task must be
a singular one.
The individual who is incarcerated has a lesser chance of
success at trial than the accused who enjoys his liberty on
bail, and a judge must be aware of that fact in determining
pre-trial release conditions; however, he must also fully appreciate the danger of providing for the easy release of a defendant
with recidivist tendencies.
The inclusion of professional sureties in the bonding system will be a controversial suggestion. The many abuses which
accompanied the professional bail bondsman in most jurisdictions are well known; nevertheless, the federal experience has
demonstrated that the surety system can be a viable and valuable addition to a bonding system when properly regulated. Such
regulation and administration are necessary to gaurantee that
only solvent and ethical surety companies be allowed to operate.
There should be, in addition, statutory definitions of the arrest
and retrieval functions of bail bondsmen, with substantial penalties to attach if defined limits are exceeded.
If a judicial officer is given the necessary discretionary
power, along with sufficient court time to render a decision, then
the first brave promise of the Illinois bonding revolution can
be realized in fairness to both the accused and society.
51 Note 1 supra, at 276.

